There are lots of ways of building a successful hockey team. Through the years, we have been witnesses (no, not basketball, I couldn’t care less about LeBron and the overinflated egos) of basically the two main models. Rebuilding by trade and rebuilding via entry draft seem to be the two base models of building any hockey team. It’s not one over the other, rather the symbiosis of both that often proves to be the winning ticket. Over the years, I’ve realized that the two base models can be divided into lot’s of different subgroups. One of these subgroups is the topic of discussion here. This is an article where I’ll try my best to analyze Burke’s model for rebuilding and creating a successful hockey team. Hope you enjoy it.

Just to get started I would like to identify the three main subgroups (models) of building and icing a good, competitive hockey team. I’ve noticed that these three ways provide most success, at least looking at the post lockout years, and years just prior to the ugliest thing ever for a hockey fan.  The three models being (this is kind of my personal nomenclature but fell free to call them anyway you like): The Perennial Contender (SJ Sharks, Detroit Red Wings and the future LA Kings), The Aggressor  (Anaheim Ducks, Toronto Maple Leafs) and the Year Skipping Contender (Chicago Blackhawks, Pittsburgh Penguins). Now let’s examine each model individually. Please note that while reading this, you might get the impression that I’m not distinguishing the rebuilding process from a team contending for the Cup, and fact is, I’m not. To me, a rebuilding process is complete once you can successfully challenge for the Cup. The last stage of the rebuilding process, at least I view it as such, is winning the Stanley Cup.

The Red Wings realized something before any of the other teams. They refused to pay a goaltender more than 2.5 mil. On July 31, 2006, at the age of 41, Hasek joined the Red Wings for the third time. He signed a one-year $750,000 US contract, with added bonuses if the team succeeded in the playoffs. Chris Osgood still has a salary of $1,450,000 and Jimmy Howard is on an entry level deal. Since last year’s playoffs, and I have already written about that, the goaltending discount as I like to call it, has been more and more a factor for NHL teams. That’s what the Sharks are doing now. And if you look at it historically, there weren’t many goaltenders that were paid huge bucks and won a Stanley Cup recently. Nikolai Khabibulin is one, and JS Giguere is another.

In the meantime, Cam Ward, Marc-Andre Fleury, Chris Osgood and Antti Niemi all took cups with a discount. Paying the goaltender a smaller amount obviously makes it easier to build a contender. Especially if the effect is about the same. It’s one thing to have a Miller or Roy caliber goaltender and pay him huge bucks, but it’s another to pay Nabokov the same amount. The more I think about it, the more it becomes clear that the notion “goaltending wins championships” has been misinterpreted. I’d call it “bad goaltending loses championships”. Actually, the only “recent” memory of a goaltender that singlehandedly won the Stanley Cup is Patrick Roy and the Habs in ’93. More often than not, it’s solid goaltending coupled with a really good team plus excellent defense.

So if solid is all you need, why not sign, oh I don’t know, Craig Anderson for $1,500,000 or Dan Ellis for $2,000,000, Chris Mason for around  $3,000,000 or even Cam Ward for $3,500,000, but why go higher? Why go Roberto Luongo $7,500,000 crazy if he doesn’t guarantee the Cup? I think I’ve made that pretty clear in one of my previous articles so let’s move one. But, just to be perfectly clear, this model is not about having a cheap goaltender. It’s about the ability of a team to sign bargain players to fit around their core which is signed long term. In the final year of his contract in 2008–09, Zetterberg agreed to a 12-year, $73 million contract extension with the Red Wings on January 28, 2009. The deal is the longest and most lucrative in franchise history.

The Red Wings could afford that with the goaltender discount they received for Chris Osgood and now Jimmy Howard. The Sharks are a perennial cup contender, as are the Wings and the Kings will be just that in a years time. Purely stat based, it would seem that the Detroit model has had more success than the other models, but stats don’t tell the whole story. In fact, during the last 15 years, the Red Wings are the only team that’s had success applying this model. It requires a highly skilled scouting department and a fantastic GM which they have in Ken Holland. Using this model, the SJ Sharks and LA Kings haven’t really won anything yet. They just looked good during the regular season.

The Sharks have indeed been a part of the group of clubs that paid they goaltender a pretty penny, but it wasn’t anywhere near the deal that Vancouver, NJ and New York are paying their goaltenders. It was still a lot of money though, but the Sharks managed to save cap space in other areas, having underpaid players that produced either at entry level deals or were just bargains. Players like Ryane Clowe, Joe Pavelski, Devin Setoguchi or previous Richard winner Jonathan Cheechoo. This year, they too completed the transition to the Detroit model signing Antero Nittymaky to a deal worth 2.000.000. Similarly to Detroit that signed Henrik Zetterberg to a good deal, Sharks tied down their core players Patrick Marleau and Joe Pavelski to multi year deals. That was possible by that extra cap space created by giving up on Nabokov, assigning less money to the crease area and Rob Blake’s retirement.

Careful planning and foresight. It’s fascinating how many stars the Sharks have and are still able to ice a good hockey team. Some may wonder if that’s going to bite them in the future. Taking into account Joe Thornton, Dany Heatley, alongside players mentioned before, one wonders if their contending years are bound to end up being a Year Skipping Contender if they eventually win the Cup.

Similarly to this model, and the basic franchise building models, the Year Skipping Contender model is based on identifying your core players and signing them to long term deals. Depth at center is key. Henrik Zetterberg, Pavel Datsyuk, Joe Thornton, Joe Pavlelski, Anze Kopitar, Michal Handzus, Sidney Crosby, Evgeni Malkin, Jordan Staal, Jonathan Toews, Patrick Sharp. Every team through those two models has it. But, what’s different about this model is the fact that teams seemingly load up for the run, maybe even too much, and then have to wait another year, in which they will be ok, but not great, for another run. It has happened to Pittsburgh this year and it will probably happen to Chicago next season. Make no mistake, the Penguins and the Hawks will be contenders again. Their core is excellent and signed long term, but now, there is just too much money tied down on relatively few players and decisions have to be made.

There is no depth on other forward positions. As it stands, the Pens have almost no top six wingers to play on a line with Crosby and Malkin, their defense is solid, especially with recent free agent signings, which raises the question, what about Jordan Staal? Paying premium dollar to a 3^rd line centerman, however good he might be, is what put the Pens in this position. And I’m not saying it’s not an enviable position, but one that has to be resolved because it affects the depth of the team. They were a great team, but realistically speaking, they were carried by the emotions of a coaching change that occurred in the middle part of the season, they were fired up because it was a rematch between the Red Wings in the Finals and Marian Hossa had to eat his words. It was karma. Everything clicked for the Pens that year. But next year, it was a different story.

Yeah, it was a good year, but the defensive core was too soft, especially with the lack of Hall Gill and Rob Scuderi. And the skipping year began. This year, the quest for the Cup in 2011-2012 begins. They won’t be contenders, but they accomplished one major thing for the quest for that second Cup. They solidified the defense and locked it up long term. Which is a big step towards contending. The Blackhawks on the other hand, lost 6 players from the cup roster. Most of them to Atlanta. Kris Versteeg came to the Leafs. And the almost successful hijacking that the San Jose Sharks attempted on defenseman Niklas Hjalmarsson will probably force the Hawks to some more wheeling and dealing. Shuffling the deck after the Cup year seems like the biggest aspect of this concept.

Finally, what you all been reading this for, let’s examine The Aggressor. God that almost sounds like a super villain. I’ll just call it the Burke model from now on. To quote the famous Monthy Python group: “And now for something completely different.” You’ve probably already noticed the similarities between all the models. It basically comes down to keeping the core together, creating cap space via goaltender discount or any kind of bargain available, plus long term deals for key players coupled with building from the back (mostly defense). Burke’s model has a little bit of everything but the main thing in common is building from the back. Other than the Wings and the Hawks, who have a clear cut philosophy about the team’s play (puck transition, mobile defense and puck possession play) I haven’t really noticed a pattern among other representatives of the respective two models. LA Kings, San Jose Sharks, Pittsburgh Penguins (which do play a strong forechecking game, but it’s hardly a regularity) seem to adapt their playing style to their current rosters while the Wings and Hawks really built a system based on which they acquired players that could play that system. And that’s exactly what Burke’s model is all about. But that’s where the similarities end. The philosophy is completely different.

The first thing you notice about Burke’s model is that it consists of aggressively pursuing wanted players on the market and building a gritty, in your face hockey team. One would think that a guy who said he doesn’t want to build through the draft, and who wants to get the rebuild done as soon as possible is rash. But on the contrary, results have shown that he’s in fact persistent and patient. And that’s maybe the best thing he possesses as a GM, patience. Word is, the Phanuef deal took months, maybe even half a year to complete so that’s an example right there. But, to start at the beginning and to get a complete picture of the model, let’s look at Vancouver. Now, there are some, mostly rival fans, that said Burke’s success with Anaheim was a fluke. With the Canucks, he was credited with reviving the ailing franchise and increasing attendance, with the drafting and signing of several key players such as Daniel and Henrik Sedin, as the team won a playoff series and captured a division title.

Well, I guess division titles don’t mean a whole lot. And it’s not like the Sedins have developed into NHL superstars. It’s not like Henrik will ever win the Art Ross Trophy. Oh, he did, did he? My bad. So, it’s not like he hasn’t had success prior to Anaheim. He was named the GM and Executive Vice-President of the Mighty Ducks on June 20, 2005. On August 1, 2005, he named former Norris Trophy-winning defenseman Randy Carlyle coach. His real genius move came when he signed Rob Niedermayer (who was very effective on the Ducks third line in his own right) in order to covet his brother Scott later. The move came to fruition on August 4, 2005 when free agent defenseman Scott Niedermayer signed with the Ducks to play with his brother. Those are all examples of Burke’s brilliant mind. He knows exactly what he wants and how to get it. And now for the model.

Like I said, building a big, mean, in your face hockey team, trading draft picks for instant top six gain and replacing them with young, talented free agents such as Bozak, Gustavsson and more recently Mueller seems the way Burke loves to operate. He himself stated that he puts all of his hockey belief in building from the back. On November 15, 2005 the Ducks traded Sergei Fedorov, and a 5th round draft pick to the Columbus Blue Jackets for defenseman Francois Beauchemin and Tyler Wright, On January 31, 2010 the Calgary Flames have traded defenceman Dion Phaneuf, forward Fredrik Sjostrom, and prospect defenceman Keith Aulie to the Toronto Maple Leafs in exchange for forwards Matt Stajan, Niklas Hagman, Jamal Mayers and defenceman Ian White.

In July 2009, Komisarek signed a 5-year contract with the Toronto Maple Leafs, averaging $4.5 million per season and of course there is the much debated Kessel deal. Those deals prove Burke’s tendencies. Burke believes that grit, sandpaper and in your face hockey, coupled with talent and size upfront is the way to go. He often makes a clear distinction between the top six and bottom six forwards and ensures that the players understand their roles on the team. One thing I respect about him is that he isn’t ready to overpay on players, with Colby Armstrong deal being really the only exception that stands out. To me, his deal was just a case of misjudging the market in getting the type of player the team needed. That also means that he has done one out of two things right in the deal. Also, he was quick to rectify the situation by getting the Kulemin deal done. Imagine how much would Kulemin be worth in this year’s free agency and then examine the deal.

Not to get too brownnosed here, I’ll conclude this text with a look back at the whole Kaberle situation. Burke was a genius in holding on to Kaberle for as long as he did. With defenceman value going through the roof, Burke has ensured that he’ll probably get a top six return if he indeed deals Kaberle, something which frankly, wouldn’t be possible earlier this year. The argument that well, he’s trading away picks and rushing it, could very well be made, but with youngsters like Kadri, Gunnarsson, Gustavsson, Bozak, Kulemin, Rynnas, Mueller, Schenn, Aulie why are you worried? Also, not every draft pick is Taylor Hall. So, I’m asking you, what’s wrong with doing it fast AND doing it right? Plus, it’s the Leafs, do we really want to wait?

In the end, however ludicrous it might be, I have to conclude that Burke’s model is the most successful one. You’re insane, The Red Wings own every model out there. Let me finish. Yes, the Wings have indeed been a pillar of strength and probably the role model for every other team out there in recent years. Their scouting department is off the charts which is visible by them getting Zetterberg, Datsyuk even Filppula so late in the draft and them being competitive year after year after year. But, with them being the only team that had success following that model one has to argue that Burke’s model has more sense for most teams. Not all teams in the league have the ability to wait it out. Revenue streams etc. can force a lot of teams into trying to be competitive cause missing the playoffs too many years in a row smells disaster. Even if his only real success until now was with Anaheim, his drafting was good, and on top of that he has made by far the best trades and free agent signings of all the GMs out there. This model has also had at least some success in every franchise run by Burke so far, and it’s looking like it may continue with the Leafs.

Mislav “Xterratu” Jantoljak